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# ORIGINAL SIN AS THE EVIL INCLINATION—A POLEMICIST'S APPRECIATION OF HUMAN NATURE*

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Studies on the essence and development of the concept of original sin abound. Not only has this fundamental tenet of Christian theology played an important role in the history of Western religious thought, but it continues to command the attention of scholars and theologians even today.[1] Given this great interest, one is occasionally surprised at the narrowness of the historical and religious framework to which many have confined their discussions of original sin. All too often, scholars have overlooked the significance which events within the community they are examining or parallel developments in other religious communities might have for explicating a new direction in the

*The following abbreviations appear in the notes:

*DCD* Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, trans. George E. McCracken et al. (7 vols.; London, 1957–72)

*PL* Patrologia Latina

*ST* Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* (60 vols.; Cambridge, 1964–76)

Vivès Thomas Aquinas, *Opera omnia*, ed. Stanislaus Eduard Fretté and Paul Myaré (34 vols.; Paris, 1874–80).

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[1]On the history of and contemporary interest in original sin, see A. Gaudel, "Péché originel," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 12/1. 275–624; Julius Gross, *Geschichte des Erbsündendogmas: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Problems vom Ursprung des Übels* (4 vols.; Munich, 1960–72); Henri Rondet, *Le péché originel dans la tradition patristique et théologique* (Paris, 1967); Urs Baumann, *Erbsünde? Ihr traditionelles Verständnis in der Krise heutiger Theologie* (Ökumenische Forschungen 2/2; Freiburg, 1970); G. M. Lukken, *Original Sin in the Roman Liturgy* (Leiden, 1973); and G. Vandervelde, *Original Sin: Two Major Trends in Contemporary Roman Catholic Reinterpretation* (Amsterdam, 1975).

history of this doctrine. While the present study can hope neither to reformulate the findings of the voluminous literature on original sin nor to compensate in large measure for this methodological shortcoming at times inherent in it, it will attempt to demonstrate by example how the notion of original sin did not evolve in a historical vacuum. It both drew from and contributed to prevalent philosophical and political theory, and it even interacted significantly with non-Christian religious concepts.

## I

In 1278, the Spanish Dominican Raymond Martini completed his mammoth anti-Jewish polemical treatise, the *Pugio fidei*, in which he tried to prove the truth of Christianity to the Jews with testimony from rabbinic literature.[2] Martini proceeded methodically in his *Pugio* from one point of Christian dogma to the next, adducing allegedly corroborating passages from the Talmud and Midrash, and in the context of his discussion on the Trinity and the need for the incarnation of Christ, the Dominican devoted a chapter to the concept of original sin.[3] After defining the Christian term *originale peccatum* [sic], the friar found evidence for it in rabbinic literature by identifying it with the Jewish concept of *yeṣer ha-ra'*, or the evil inclination. Martini then ably gathered an extensive array of talmudic, midrashic, and exegetical texts concerning the evil inclination which convinced him that the sages of the Jews acknowledged the truth of the Christian doctrine in question. He cited rabbinic statements to the effect that the evil inclination makes man essentially evil from the time of his birth, that over the course of history it caused the destruction of both Jewish temples and the death of many rabbinic scholars, that it reigns over a man's heart with continually greater power until the day of his death, that as a result of it man can rightly be described

[2] *Pugio fidei adversus Mauros et Judaeos* (1687; reprint ed., Westmead, 1967). Although the first brief philosophical section of this work was directed by Martini at Muslim Averroists, the overall anti-Jewish emphasis of the book is evident in its author's opening statement (prooemium §§ 2–3, p. 2): "Deinde cum juxta sententiam Senecae, 'nulla pestis sit efficacior ad nocendum quam familiaris inimicus': nullus autem inimicus Christianae fidei magis sit familiaris, magisque nobis inevitabilis, quam Judaeus . . . hujusmodi pugionem . . . talem tamen, qualem scivero, atque potuero principaliter contra Judaeos; deinde contra Saracenos, et alios quosdam verae fidei adversarios fabricabo."

[3] Ibid., 3.2.6, pp. 579–89.

as born in sin, and that in waging a constant battle against it man can overcome it only with God's help.

As Martini amassed this evidence from classical Jewish sources, he argued and emphasized exactly what one would have expected of him in such a situation: the acceptance of the idea of the evil inclination by the rabbis and its likeness to that of original sin, i.e., its dire effects on man and its congenital character. Most striking, then, is Martini's insertion, towards the end of this chapter on original sin as *yeṣer ha-ra'*, of the following midrash on Eccl 3:11 ("He has made everything to suit its time. . . ."):

> R. Benjamin said: "He has placed the love of the world in their heart."
> R. Nehemiah said: "'He has made everything to suit its time,' as Scripture has said [Gen 1:31], 'And God saw all that he had made, and it was [very good].' 'Good' refers to the good inclination; 'very [good]' refers to the evil inclination. Yet is the evil inclination really very good? Rather, [this comes] to teach you that were it not for the evil inclination, man would not have built a house, would not have married, and would not have begotten children. And thus Solomon said [Eccl 4:4], '[I considered all toil and all achievement and saw that] it comes from rivalry between man and man.'"[4]

Martini has here quoted this famous rabbinic homily from the Midrash *Qohelet Rabbah*,[5] but he probably had available to him different versions of the passage which added that were it not for the evil inclination, man "would not have engaged in trade" and "the world [i.e., civilization] would not have become enduring."[6]

At the beginning of this chapter on original sin, Martini defined this important term in Christian theology as "the tinder of sin, that is, concupiscence, or a tendency to concupiscence, which is at times called the law of the limbs of the body, at times the weakness of nature, at times the tyrant who is in our limbs, at

[4]Ibid., 3.2.6.6, p. 587: "Dixit R. Benjamin, Amorem mundi dedit in cordibus ipsorum. Dixit R. Nehemias, 'Cuncta fecit pulcra in tempore suo (Eccles. 3 v. 11),' sicut dictum est" (Gen. 1 v. 31), "Et vidit Deus totum quod fecerat, et ecce bonum valde.' 'Et ecce bonum,' hoc est, figmentum bonum. 'Valde,' hoc est, figmentum malum. Et nunquid figmentum malum est bonum valde? Non nisi ex consequenti: nisi enim figmentum malum fuisset, non aedificasset homo domum, nec duxisset uxorem, nec procreasset filios; quia sic dicit Salomoh (Eccles. 4 v. 4), 'Quia ipsa est aemulatio viri, vel cujuslibet a proximo suo.'"

[5]*Qoh. Rab.* 3.11.3,whence the version the text above.

[6]*Gen. Rab.* 9 (on 1:31); *Midr. Tehillim* 9.1. For confirmation of the regular use which Raymond Martini made of these midrashic collections, see Saul Lieberman, *Shkiin: A Few Words on Some Jewish Legends, Customs, and Literary Sources Found in Karaite and Christian Works* [Hebrew] (2d ed., Jerusalem, 1970) 85–86, 88.

times the law of the flesh."[7] If Martini then strove to prove the identity of original sin and the evil inclination, why did he adduce a rabbinic homily which describes—and which would have been understood by any Jew as describing—*yeṣer ha-ra'* as a beneficent drive in man, one producing many worthy results that were hardly the dire effects of original sin? Moreover, if in this famous midrashic passage—and, as will be seen presently, in others too—rabbinic tradition portrayed the evil inclination as a constructive force and an asset to mankind, how did a highly knowledgeable and skilled disputant like Martini serve his purposes by identifying it with original sin in the first place? Would he not have thereby weakened his position before his Jewish listeners and polemical adversaries? From the early days of Christian history, the notion of original sin as deriving from Adam's fall and requiring the incarnation of God to atone for it—without which atonement man could not hope to merit salvation—constituted one of the sharpest lines of demarcation between rabbinic Judaism and Christianity. In his Epistle to the Romans,[8] Paul himself explained that the sin which everyone inherited from Adam demanded that one forsake a life of Jewish observance (i.e., an attempt to observe Mosaic law) for Jesus' new covenant of grace. For

> except through law I should never have become acquainted with sin. For example, I should never have known what it was to covet, if the law had not said, "Thou shalt not covet." Through that commandment sin found its opportunity and produced in me all kinds of wrong desires. In the absence of law, sin is a dead thing. There was a time when, in the absence of law, I was fully alive; but when the commandment came, sin sprang to life, and I died. The commandment which should have led to life proved in my experience to lead to death, because sin found its opportunity in the commandment, seduced me, and through the commandment killed me. . . . Miserable creature that I am, who is there to rescue me out of this body doomed to death? God alone, through Jesus Christ our Lord![9]

Judaism, however, has always remained committed to the notion that the performance of the biblical commandments lies within reach of human capabilities; while every individual may have

[7] *Pugio* 3.2.6.1, p. 579: "'Originale peccatum' itaque dicitur apud nos 'fomes peccati,' scilicet 'concupiscentia,' vel 'concupiscibilitas,' quae quandoque dicitur 'lex membrorum,' quandoque 'languor naturae,' quandoque 'tyrranus, qui est in membris nostris,' quandoque 'lex carnis.'"

[8] 5:12–19.

[9] 7:7–11, 24–25. All biblical quotations have been taken from the *NEB*.

inherited the mortality inflicted upon Adam in punishment for his sin, he himself is born guiltless, with the opportunity to determine the good or sinful character of his own life.[10] Even most modern Jewish theologians who mention original sin in their writings do so only to affirm that Judaism has never accepted the doctrine.[11] On what basis, then, could Raymond Martini have convincingly equated *yeṣer ha-ra'* and original sin? Answering this question requires an examination of each religious concept as the Dominican would have encountered and understood it: the evil inclination in the Talmud and Midrash and original sin as currently interpreted in Martini's time and milieu.

## II

The absence of any systematic formulation of rabbinic theology in the Talmud and Midrash and the resulting plethora of rabbinic homilies on any theological issue make generalizing as to a "normative" Jewish viewpoint difficult indeed; one often finds it nearly impossible to make a fair, generalized statement of exactly what the ancient Jewish rabbis thought and believed. Yet with this caveat in mind, we might define the evil inclination as the passionate, lustful energy within man's nature which, if left unchecked, moves him irrationally to sin.[12] Implicit in this statement are most of the specific beliefs of the rabbis concerning *yeṣer ha-ra'*

[10]Cf. Deut 30:11–14; Solomon Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology* (New York, 1910) 185–89; George Foot Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (2 vols.; 1927–30; reprint ed., New York, 1971) 1. 474–76, 479; and especially F. R. Tennant, *The Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin* (1903; reprint ed., New York, 1968) 160–68. Tennant points out that even the idea that all men inherit Adam's punishment of mortality originated only among the Amora'im of the third century.

[11]See, e.g., Samson Raphael Hirsch, trans. and comment., *Der Pentateuch übersetzt und erläutert* (Frankfurt, 1867) 1. 84–85 (ad Gen 3:19); C. G. Montefiore, *Judaism and St. Paul: Two Essays* (London, 1914) 135–38; Leo Baeck, *The Essence of Judaism* (rev. ed.; ed. Irving Howe, trans. Victor Grubenwieser and Leonard Pearl; New York, 1948) 161; and Isidore Epstein, *The Faith of Judaism: An Interpretation for Our Times* (London, 1954) 220, 292.

[12]For descriptions of the notion of *yeṣer ha-ra'*, see Frank Chamberlin Porter, "The Yeçer Hara: A Study in the Jewish Doctrine of Sin," in *Biblical and Semitic Studies* (New York, 1901) 91–156; Tennant, *The Sources*, 168–76; Schechter, *Some Aspects*, chaps. 15–16; Moore, *Judaism*, 1. 468–93; Norman Powell Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin: A Historical and Critical Study* (London, 1927) 59–74; and Ephraim E. Urbach, *The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs*, trans. Israel Abrahams (2 vols.; Jerusalem, 1975) 1. 471–77.

expressed homiletically throughout the Talmud and Midrash. The fact that the evil inclination exists within man's nature means that God created it; the rabbis believed that every child inherits it at birth and that it dwells in a man's heart, the seat of passion, until his death.[13] At that time, God will remove the evil inclination from man, permitting the righteous to exult in their salvation without impediment.[14] During one's lifetime *yeṣer ha-ra'* has a variety of potential effects. Above all, if not controlled, it gains successively greater power over a man, causing him to follow the urges of his passions and thereby contravene the divine law.[15] Various sources differ over whether *yeṣer ha-ra'* causes men to sin primarily in the lustful pursuit of what they perceive visually, or, alternatively, in the spiteful violation of those Mosaic statutes (*ḥuqqim*) which, in the absence of evident rational explanations, must be accepted on faith alone.[16] Yet ultimately, the evil inclination moves man to the epitome of irrational passion: the abandonment of God and worship of idols.

> He who tears his clothes in anger, and he who breaks his vessels in anger, and he who squanders his money in anger should be regarded by you as an idolator, because such is the work of the evil inclination. Today it tells him, "Do this," and the next day it tells him, "Do that," until finally it tells him, "Engage in idolatry," and he goes and does so.[17]

Then, after enticing man here in this world, the evil inclination will testify against him when he appears before God for judgment in the next world. The rabbis conjectured at times that such a demonic force could be no other than Satan or the angel of death himself, and they were confident that God repented over having created it.[18]

As already stated, however, the evil inclination exercises these malevolent influences on man only if man fails to control it; for the power of this passion is inferior to that of the human will, and just as God created *yeṣer ha-ra'*, so he also created the means whereby man could overcome its temptations. Without such aid, man might well be doomed to succumb to its murderous

[13] *B. Qidd.* 30b; *Ber.* 61a; *'Abot R. Nat.* A, chap. 16.

[14] *Exod. Rab.* 41.12; *b. Sanh.* 103a; *Num. Rab.* 17.6.

[15] See the statements of R. Isaac, R. Asi, and Rava in *b. Sukk.* 52.

[16] *B. Sanh.* 45a; *Sipra*, Aḥarei § 9 (on 13:9).

[17] *B. Sabb.* 105b. cf. the statement of R. Meir in *Song Rab.* 2.4.1 and also *Exod. Rab.* 41.12.

[18] *B. B. Bat.* 16a; *Sukk.* 52b.

tendencies.[19] But through the study of God's Torah and the observance of the divine commandments, men can subjugate their evil inclinations to their desires to do good, making themselves worthy of heavenly reward.[20] Significantly, nowhere do the sources speak of a man ridding himself of his evil inclination during his lifetime; the goal of the rabbinic advice appears to be the breaking of the controlling power and dominion of *yeṣer ha-ra'* rather than its destruction. The famous mishnaic adage, "Who is a mighty man?—he that subdues his [evil] inclination (*ha-kovesh et yiṣro*)," [21] suggests that there must be some positive value in conquering but not doing away with one's evil impulse, an inference confirmed explicitly in several other passages. In the *'Abot de-Rabbi Natan*, R. Simeon ben Eleazar counsels that "the evil impulse is like iron which one holds in a flame. So long as it is in the flame one can make of it any implement he pleases. So too the evil impulse: its only remedy is in the words of Torah, for they are like fire" and should enable man to be at peace with his passions.[22] And on the commandment of Deut 6:5 to love God with all of one's heart, the Midrash asks why the final consonant of the word heart (usually *lev*) has here been doubled (to spell *levav*) and answers that the double letter teaches you to love God "with both of your inclinations, with the good inclination and with the evil inclination."[23]

Not only do the rabbis thus indicate that the righteous man is obliged both to subdue the energies of his evil inclination and then to channel them in the proper direction, but in more than an isolated instance they affirm the worth and value of *yeṣer ha-ra'* in and of itself, even without the stipulation that its passionate drives be subjected to the yoke of the Torah. "An [evil] impulse, a child, and a woman—the left hand should reject them and the right hand draw them near."[24] In other words, the desires of the evil inclination are necessary in moderate doses. Another talmudic homily voices the same lesson in more graphic detail, departing

[19] *B. Sukk.* 52b; *Sanh.* 105a; *Qidd.* 30b; cf. *B. Bat.* 16a.

[20] *B. Sukk.* 52b; *Qidd.* 16a; *Sanh.* 43b; *Lev. Rab.* 34a.

[21] *M. 'Abot* 4.1; cf. Charles Taylor, ed., *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers* (rev. ed.; New York, 1969) 63–64 and n. 2.

[22] Judah Goldin, trans., *The Fathers according to Rabbi Nathan* (Yale Judaica Series 10; New Haven, 1955) chap. 16, p. 85.

[23] *Sipre Deut.* 32 (on 6:5).

[24] *B. Sanh.* 107b.

from Neh 9:4, in which the newly restored post-exilic Jewish community expresses its anguish over the recent plight of its people. In response to these entreaties, the evil inclination, deemed responsible for having led the Jews into idolatry and immorality and thereby having caused the destruction of the First Temple, was delivered up to the people. But according to Rav (or R. Yoḥanan), a prophet then said to them:

> "Behold, if you kill this 'man,' the whole world will be destroyed." They bound it for three days, and they searched throughout the land of Israel for a freshly laid egg for a sick person, but one could not be found. They said, "What shall we do? If we kill it, the world would cease to exist." . . . They took out its eyes and released it, and it helped in that man does not have incestuous lust.[25]

Unbridled, the lustful drives of man's nature may indeed have incited the Jews to sin in a ruinous fashion, but without libidinal energy, the world could simply not survive; not even a chicken could lay an egg.

The evil inclination of the rabbinic tradition may thus be characterized as follows: A divinely created aspect of human nature bequeathed to every individual, it has the capacity to overcome man's reason with irrational passion and lead him to the worst of sinful acts. Man must therefore seek to subdue—not to obliterate— it by pursuing the life prescribed in God's revealed law, with the goal of channeling it and directing it towards worthwhile ends. For it comprises an essential constitutive element of man and the world, without which men would not have formed families, built communities, or undertaken to earn a living; quite simply, civilized society would never have come into existence.

## III

Could Raymond Martini reasonably equate this rabbinic conception of the evil inclination with the Christian doctrine of original sin? At the beginning of the chapter on *yeṣer ha-ra'* in the *Pugio*, Martini corroborated his aforementioned definition of original sin[26] with a reference to the *De continentia* of Augustine, which in view of the latter's crucial role in developing and formulating the doctrine of original sin for the Roman Church should come as no

[25] *B. Yoma* 69b; cf. *Sanh.* 64a.
[26] See above, n. 7.

surprise.[27] Nevertheless, if one examines the Augustinian conception of original sin, he will find that it in no way approximates the rabbinic notion of the evil inclination. Rather, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, Martini needed to discard an Augustinian view of original sin in favor of a Thomistic approach in order to advance his position, a change which accords well with the general development of Martini's religious thought. If in his earliest writings Martini did display Augustinian leanings in matters of theology,[28] he soon adopted a more propaedeutic and Thomistic mode of philosophic thought, having come under the direct personal influence of the Angelic Doctor of Paris. Martini served as the emissary of Raymond de Peñaforte to Thomas Aquinas in 1269/70, and he may have convinced his Dominican confrère to compose the *Summa contra gentiles.* Probably as a result of the discussions which then ensued between Martini and Aquinas, Aquinas borrowed from Martini's *Capistrum Iudeorum* in the *Contra gentiles*, and Martini drew heavily from the latter work in the *Pugio fidei*—primarily in the first and shortest of the *Pugio's* three parts, which dealt not with confuting the Jews but with proving the basic tenets of Christian theology to skeptical Moors by means of philosophical argumentation.[29] If Martini's borrowing from Aquinas included the latter's views on original sin, the identification of original sin with

[27]Augustine *De continentia* 3.8 (*PL* 40. 354); because Martini has copied this reference, as well as his definition of original sin, from Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* (2.30.8), he joined Peter Lombard in incorrectly attributing the Augustinian statement to a tract entitled *De baptismo parvulorum.* On the centrality of Augustine in the history of Catholic teaching on original sin, see, e.g., Gaudel, "Péché originel," 371, who dubs Augustine the "docteur de péché originel et de la grâce"; J. Turmel, "Le dogme du péché originel dans saint Augustine," *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses* 6 (1901) 425–26; Williams, *The Ideas*, 319; and Gross, *Geschichte*, 1. 375: "Augustinus ist somit im Vollsinn des Wortes der Vater des Erbsündendogmas."

[28]On Martini's first theological treatise, the *Explanatio symboli apostolorum*, see F. Cavallera, "L' 'Explanatio simboli apostolorum' de Raymond Martin, O.P.," in *Studia mediaevalia in honorem admodum reverendi patris Raymundi Josephi Martin* (Bruges, 1948) 201–20; André Berthier, "Un maître orientaliste du xiii$^{e}$ siècle: Raymond Martin O.P.," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 6 (1936) 299; and Tomás and Joaquín Carreras y Artau, *Historia de la filosofia español: Filosofia cristiana de los siglos xiii al xv* (2 vols.; Madrid, 1939–43) 1. 153–54.

[29]Berthier, "Un maître," 299–304; Thomas Aquinas, *Liber de veritate catholice fidei contra errores infidelium*, ed. Peter Marc et al. (3 vols.; Tours, 1961–67) 1. 3, 60–73; Thomas Murphy, "The Date and Purpose of the *Contra Gentiles*," *HeyJ* 10 (1969) 405–15.

*yeṣer ha-ra'* in the *Pugio fidei* becomes—and then would have been—much more plausible. A comparison of Thomistic teaching on the subject of original sin with that of Augustine should make this point clear.

*The essence and origin of original sin*

According to the basic doctrine which Augustine had transmitted to posterity (i.e., as opposed to his earlier, and occasionally different, views on the subject), original sin consists of a culpable disorder of the will which caused Adam proudly to rebel against God and eat of the forbidden fruit.[30] God did not create or cause this rebelliousness in man, but it originated entirely within the *voluntas* of the first parent and resulted in his fall: "For this sin, which is imputed *originale*, would not have existed without the work of free will, with which the first man sinned—through whom [i.e., the first man] sin entered the world and passed on to all men."[31] The fall of man in turn meant simply that man was to be dominated by this sin; for just as the soul of man had willfully deserted God, to whom it was rightfully subservient, so it lost its ability to control that which should have been its servant, the human body. The natural state in which God had created man was ruined; henceforth the human body was doomed to die, whereby the primal unity of body and soul was destroyed.[32] Moreover, even during his lifetime man could no longer suppress the carnal lusting of his body in opposition to the rational dictates of his will: "His human nature was so corrupted and changed within him that he suffered in his members a rebellious disobedience of desire."[33] His existence became characterized by concupiscence and ignorance, and he might well be thought of as living a life of falsehood, since he no longer lived after the fashion for which God had designed him.[34]

Aquinas departed from this Augustinian teaching on several fundamental points. Above all, Aquinas distinguished generically between actual sin (i.e., Adam's willful rebellion against God) and original sin; since all men are endowed with original sin from the

[30] *DCD* 14.11.
[31] *Contra Julianum Pelagianum* 6.10.28 (*PL* 44. 838).
[32] *DCD* 13.6,13; 14.11.
[33] *DCD* 13.13 (4. 144–45); 14.15.
[34] *DCD* 14.4.

moment of birth and since actual sin derives from an act of will not yet possessed by infants, the two could not be identical.[35] Original sin, in the Thomistic view, is rather the state of spiritual disorderliness into which Adam was cast as a result of his actual sin, and because this fallen state constituted the basis for all human existence—as opposed to sins pertaining strictly to an individual which are not inherited by his children—the first parents bore their children into it. Hence the Thomistic definition: "*original* sin in one man or another is nothing other than that which extended to him, *in his origin*, from the sin of the first parent."[36]

Moreover, Aquinas identified original sin with no positive, specific action or trait, characterizing it instead as the privation of that gift of original justice which God had bestowed upon man when creating him.[37] In the state of original justice, man would have been capable of realizing the spiritual end of communion with God, for which purpose God had indeed created him; without original justice, man can no longer properly order his various drives and appetites, and he falls subject to the frailties of human existence. Original sin, then, defined simply as the loss of original justice, does not of itself produce vice in man or in any active way induce him to sin. Admittedly, Aquinas did include the element of concupiscence in some of his descriptions of original sin; in his *De malo*, for example, he wrote:

> Therefore, since there is a lack of original justice in the will and since there is a tendency to inordinate lust, which can be called concupiscence, in the lower powers moved by the will, it follows that original sin in this man or another is nothing other than concupiscence with a lack of original justice—in such a way, though, that the lack of original justice is quasi-formal in original sin and concupiscence quasi-material.[38]

Elsewhere, however, particularly in the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas stresses his identification of original sin with the loss of original justice more than with concupiscence, and some modern scholars have aptly suggested that Aquinas might have omitted the element of concupiscence altogether from his discussion on original sin and believe that he paid lip service to it merely in deference to St. Augustine. The thrust of the Thomistic portrayal of original sin

[35] *Liber de veritate (Summa contra gentiles)* 4.50.
[36] *De malo* 4.2 (Vivès 13. 418), emphasis mine; see also *ST* 1–2.81.2.
[37] *ST* 1–2.82.1, ad 1–2; 1–2.83.3.
[38] *De malo* 4.2 (Vivès 13. 419).

implied that concupiscence was in fact no more than an effect—as opposed to a constitutive element—of original sin, and such is the way in which various medieval disciples of Thomas understood his teaching.[39] When Aquinas labeled concupiscence the material essence of original sin, he thus referred not to any positive, lustful inclination of men—that concupiscence to which Augustine had linked original sin, and which, in the Thomistic view, was merely a result of original sin but not something inherently sinful.[40] Rather, in speaking of original sin as concupiscence, Aquinas meant nothing other than the disordered state of human sensuality in the wake of the privation of original justice. Or in other words, original sin, a characteristic of human spirituality, was *formally* caused by the privation of original justice; Aquinas identified it *materially*—i.e., substantially—with concupiscence to denote what remained after that privation.[41]

### *The transmission of original sin*

Proceeding from the actual sin and fall of Adam, Augustine had taught that the punishment of the first parents included their inability to produce offspring that would not resemble themselves; their descendants too were to be what they had come to be through vice and appropriate retribution.[42] Yet not undeservedly did Adam's posterity inherit his punishment. Augustine asserted the solidarity of the entire human race in the person of the first father; when he sinned, so did all men.[43] Every individual accordingly shares in the lusting of the flesh against God and against the spirit, a plight which derives from the sexual concupiscence in which everyone is conceived. No one escapes such concupiscence, neither the chaste and married nor the adulterous, neither baptized Christians nor infidels; while the spiritual renewal obtained through the sacraments of marriage and baptism might remove the

[39]See Charles J. Keating, *The Effects of Original Sin in the Scholastic Tradition from St. Thomas Aquinas to William Ockham* (Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology 2/120; Washington, 1959) 52–53; cf. Gaudel, "Péché originel," 471; and O. Lottin, "Le péché originel chez Albert le Grand, Bonaventure et Thomas d'Aquin," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 12 (1940) 314.

[40]*ST* 1–2.82.1; 1–2.89.5.

[41]Cf. J.-B. Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel d'après S. Thomas: Les sources—la doctrine* (Bibliothèque thomiste 2; Paris, 1930) 98–99, 154, 158; see also Gaudel, "Péché originel," 478–84; and Keating, *The Effects*, 49, 52–54.

[42]*DCD* 13.3.

[43]*DCD* 13.14 (4. 180–81); cf. *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* 3.7.14, and *Contra Julianum Pelagianum* 3.18.35.

culpability of parents for the lust of their sexual union, the sinful essence of the concupiscence itself determines the nature of the offspring thereby conceived:[44]

> Through the evil will of that one man all men have sinned in him, since all men were that one man, from whom as individuals they have inherited original sin. . . . Therefore there are no men free of sin, since they are born of that union which cannot be completed without shameful lust.[45]

Once again, Aquinas took issue. Because he distinguished between Adam's actual sin and original sin, such notions of human solidarity in Adam, espoused by virtually all Catholic theologians since and including Augustine, could not account for either the transmission of original sin from Adam to his descendants or their culpability for original sin. Whereas original sin characterizes man's rational soul, ideas of human solidarity did not account for the willful character of a transmitted spiritual state, but merely the participation in a specific physical act; and for Aquinas, the traducian view that "the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen" amounted to outright heresy.[46] Instead, Aquinas explained

[44] *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* 2.42; *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 2.21.36.

[45] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, 2.5.15 (*PL* 44. 444); cf. *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* 2.9.11. The exact function of concupiscence in Augustine's thought on original sin is hard to determine; at times it seems as if concupiscence is identified with the original sin in every individual, while elsewhere a distinction is drawn between a state of culpability for Adam's lust or *reatus concupiscentiae*, equated with original sin, and concupiscence itself, the punishment (in itself sinful as well) for original sin and the agent of its transmission from one generation to the next. Modern views on the subject often divide along party lines, Protestant theologians arguing that Augustine identified original sin with sexual passion and Catholics stressing the distinction between *reatus concupiscentiae* and *concupiscentia*. See, e.g., Turmel, "Le dogme," *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses* 7 (1902) 129–35; F. Donau, "La pensée de Saint Augustin sur la nature du péché originel," *Revue apologetique* 34 (1922) 414–25, 486–95; Williams, *The Ideas*, 365ff.; Gaudel, "Péché originel," 396–98; and Hans Staffner, "Die Lehre des Hl. Augustinus über das Wesen der Erbsünde," *ZKTh* 79 (1957) 385–416. Yet even though, as all will agree Augustine maintained, the physical act of sexual intercourse transmits original sin, the guilt of original sin is essentially that of the soul (*DCD* 13.13, 14.15), and Augustine was constantly troubled by the problem of how original sin entered the soul of a newly born person. He never decided conclusively between the answers of traducianism and creationism; each had its shortcomings, although the exigencies of the Pelagian controversy often induced Augustine to espouse the former over the latter. See especially Turmel, "Le dogme," 7. 135–46; Rondet, *Le péché originel*, 161–67; and Gross, *Geschichte*, 1. 334–46.

[46] *ST* 1.118.2 (15. 152–53); "Et ideo haereticum est dicere quod is anima intellectiva traducatur cum semine." For Aquinas' dissatisfaction with such explana-

that all men contract original sin because, in their physical descent from Adam, they share in his nature which was altered as a result of sin—altered inasmuch as men have since been incapable of receiving a rational soul endowed with the gift of original justice.[47] And regarding the culpability of all men for original sin, Aquinas wrote:

> So too the disorder which is in an individual man . . . is not voluntary by reason of his personal will, but by reason of the will of the first parent, who through a generative impulse, exerts influence upon all who descend from him by way of origin, even as the will of the soul moves bodily members to their various activities. Accordingly, the sin passing in this way from the first parent to his descendants is called "original," as a sin passing from the soul to the body's members is called "actual." Similarly, even as an actual sin committed through some bodily member is a sin of that member only as part of the man himself, and so is called a "sin of man," so also original sin is the sin of the individual person only because he receives human nature from the first parent; and it is called "a sin of nature."[48]

Aquinas could therefore accord with Augustine on the principle that parents impart original sin to their progeny *semenaliter*, through the process of sexual reproduction, inasmuch as this process transmits all aspects of human nature. As a result, if a man could be generated spontaneously and not be born of a sexual union, he would not contract original sin. Thomas also believed that while baptism removes the guilt of original sin, children of baptized parents still inherit it, because even after baptism original sin remains as the "tinder of sin" (*fomes peccati*) in the lower powers of body and soul, and these are the powers of man which function in generation.[49] Nevertheless, Aquinas still remained true to his distinction between actual sin and original sin; he did not maintain that the sinful concupiscence of the parents' act of sex engendered sin in their offspring. Sexual intercourse is a natural process, and while in man's fallen state it may be ridden with sinful lust, *that* concupiscence is only a manifestation of the penalty which men pay for original sin, not the sin itself.[50]

### *Original sin, the state of nature, and human society*

According to Augustine, when Adam "of his own will committed that great sin, he perverted, vitiated, and defiled human nature

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tions of human solidarity, see *Liber de veritate* 4.51–52; *ST* 1–2.81.1

[47] *Liber de veritate* 4.52.

[48] *ST* 1–2.81.1 (26. 10–11).

[49] Ibid., ad 2; 1–2.81.3, ad 2; 1–2.81.4.

[50] *ST* 1–2.17.9; 1–2.83.1, c. and ad 1.

in himself."[51] And just as all men sinned with Adam, so too did they inherit the unnatural state of existence into which he was cast; "that weakness deriving from the loss of immortality is not [in our] nature, but a flaw [in it]."[52] Had Adam and Eve not sinned and had they remained in their natural condition, they would have been free of mortality, physical ailment, lust, ignorance, and anger; they still would have engaged in sexual intercourse (in order to procreate) and would have had to eat, but their appetites would have remained completely subordinate to the rational wills.[53] Since the fall of man, human society was a depraved *massa peccati*, in which all men, except for the few redeemed pilgrims of God's heavenly city, lived unnatural lives of excessive greed, pride, and sexual passion. Man could do nothing of his own free will to better the condition into which his original sin had led him.[54]

While Aquinas agreed that human mortality, ignorance, misery, and passion all resulted from original sin,[55] his view of original sin as simply the privation of original justice led to the conclusion that human nature remained essentially intact. Undoubtedly under the influence of Aristotle, Aquinas conceived of the state of nature as a philosophically necessary attribute of man without which humanity could not exist.[56] Accordingly, "nature itself is not intrinsically changed through a deviation in voluntary action"—i.e., a willful act of sin.[57]

Yet Thomas did label original sin "a sin of nature" (*peccatum naturale*), and as we have seen, he explained its transmission in terms of all men inheriting Adam's nature. If Adam's sin did not destroy or corrupt the essence of human nature, it certainly must have affected it seriously, a point explained with reference to the phrase that man in sin "is stripped of the gifts of grace and wounded with regard to the endowments of nature" (*expoliatur*

[51] *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* 4.104 (*PL* 45. 1401); cf. also *DCD* 12.1, 22.24; and *De libero arbitrio* 2.20.54.

[52] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 2.34.57 (*PL* 44. 471).

[53] *DCD* 13.27; 14.1, 16–19, 22–26.

[54] See the elaborate description in *DCD* 22.22, as well as the illustrative treatment of Augustine's "Psychology of Fallen Man" by Herbert A. Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York, 1963) 39–77.

[55] *ST* 1–2.85.3–6.

[56] Keating, *The Effects*, 70.

[57] *ST* 1–2.85.1; 1.100.1

*gratuitis, et vulneratur in naturalibus*).[58] Specifically, Aquinas spoke of three good aspects of human nature: (1) its constitutive principles, like the powers of the soul; (2) an inclination to virtue; and (3) the divine gift of original justice, deemed "natural" inasmuch as it had been bestowed upon the nature of the first parents and would have been inherited by their children, had Adam not sinned. As a result of Adam's sin, human nature lost the gift of original justice with which God had graciously endowed it, as well as some of its direction towards the virtuous end that God had intended it to pursue with his help. But human nature itself, in its basic constitutive elements, remained identical to what it would have been before the fall, had God not granted it original justice, except for a lessening of its inclination to virtue.[59] And "this inclination is not the actual possession of virtues, but [only] a capacity for their acquisition."[60] Only the *super*natural, divine gift of original justice, not nature itself, had afforded man perfect knowledge of God, control over his appetites, the ability to perform meritorious deeds, and immortality; with his nature alone, man would have lived the same mortal life of concupiscence and ignorance which he does now, as a result of original sin.[61] "The principal penalty for original sin," Aquinas could thus conclude, "is that human nature is left to itself."[62]

Reviewing the Thomistic view of original sin, one finds that precisely those points over which Aquinas differed with Augustine might have led Raymond Martini to rely on the Angelic Doctor of Paris in equating original sin and *yeṣer ha-ra'*. First, like the rabbinic doctrine of the evil inclination, the Thomistic position identified the disorderliness inherent in the human soul neither with any actual sin (i.e., Adam's) nor with any intrinsically sinful concupiscence, in the sense of a craving for sexual pleasures. Although such concupiscence might comprise a result and manifestation of original sin, it does not itself make man culpable, since

[58]*ST* 1–2.81.1; 1–2.85.1 (26.80–81). Aquinas ascribes this *auctoritas* to Bede's commentary on Luke, but it is therein nowhere to be found; see the editorial comment of T. C. O'Brien, 80, n. f.

[59]*ST* 1–2.85.1; 1.100.1.

[60]See O'Brien's comments in *ST* 26. 157.

[61]*ST* 1.95; 1.97, passim.

[62]*ST* 1–2.87.7 (27. 34–37). On the notion of pure nature—without original justice or original sin—see Keating, *The Effects*, 15ff.; Kors, *La justice*, 162; Gaudel, "Péché originel," 484; and O'Brien's comments in *ST* 26. 150–51.

sexual passion constitutes a basic expression of human nature. Second, Aquinas' views on the transmission of original sin further allowed for greater similarity between it and the evil inclination; for while Aquinas never denied the culpability of all men for original sin, he deemphasized their actual guilt and abstracted it into an inability to achieve what they could have achieved in a state of original justice. All men did not participate with Adam in his actual sin nor do they inherit original sin from the concupiscence of their parents' sexual union. Rather, men are culpable for—and therefore inherit—original sin because in descending physically from Adam, they necessarily share in his nature and will, in much the same way as a hand expresses and bears responsibility for the will of the head which directs it. One rabbinic opinion likewise explained the entrance of the evil inclination into the human soul as a punishment inflicted upon Adam for his disobedience and subsequently inherited by all succeeding generations, a view cited by Martini in the *Pugio*.[63] And third, Aquinas' insistence that the fall of man did not destroy or corrupt human nature implies that the *state* of men living in original sin—just like that of man living with his evil inclination—*is* man's divinely created state of nature, simply deprived of that supernatural gift which prevents the disorder of the human soul from taking its toll. In reality, then, the state of fallen man's soul, although relatively inferior to what it once was, is still for Aquinas a good one in an absolute sense; as in rabbinic thought, man's spiritual or rational energy, albeit disordered, can still be channeled towards valuable ends, especially—but not exclusively— with the revealed instruction of God, whether by observing the Mosaic commandments or accepting the grace of the Gospel. To be sure, God's creation of *yeṣer ha-ra'*, the resulting lack of human culpability for possessing

[63]See *'Abot R. Nat.* B, chap. 42; and *Pugio* 3.2.7.3, p. 593, quoting the gloss of Rashi on Isa 5:1ff.: "'Et elapidavit illam' a figmento malo donec comedit de ligno, et tunc intravit in ipsum figmentum malum. . . . 'Et ascendet spina, et vepres,' id est, praevalebit in eo figmentum malum, et in generationibus ejus post eum ad faciendum opera incomposita, et inordinata." While this gloss appears as Rashi's only here in the *Pugio*, see on Martini's general credibility in his citation of rabbinic sources, Saul Lieberman, "Raymund Martini and His Alleged Forgeries," *Historia Judaica* 5 (1943) 87–102, and idem, *Shkiin*, 43–98. Specifically with regard to Martini's use of Rashi, see Ch. Merchavya, "Regarding the Rashi Commentary to *'Ḥelek'* [Hebrew]," *Tarbiz* 33 (1964) 259–86, and idem, "Additional Information Concerning the Rashi Commentary to *Ḥelek* [Hebrew]," *Tarbiz* 35 (1966) 278–94.

it, and man's theoretical potential to overcome it of his own free will were all antithetical to the doctrine of original sin. Yet the relative proximity between the Thomistic and rabbinic beliefs, especially as opposed to the gap between *yeṣer ha-ra'* and original sin as portrayed by Augustine, is marked, and it certainly permitted the identification of the two as undertaken by Raymond Martini in the *Pugio fidei.*

## IV

If Aquinas' new formulation of the doctrine of original sin enabled Raymond Martini to identify it with the evil inclination, the Dominican's polemic in turn demonstrates the alacrity with which the Thomistic idea gained acceptance and popularity in Western Christendom. Moreover, Martini's curious reference to the positive, constructive aspects of *yeṣer ha-ra'*, as he asserted the latter's identity with original sin, hints at the significance which one ought to accord his view of original sin for reflecting a new medieval approach towards human life and nature. We recall the *Pugio fidei*'s inclusion of the midrash describing *yeṣer ha-ra'* as an indispensable element in the formation and maintenance of human civilization. Without the evil inclination, men would not have settled down in permanent communities, married and raised children, or engaged in trade and commerce; for the self-centered, libidinal energies of *yeṣer ha-ra'* do derive from the human nature which God created to pursue highly worthwhile ends. With this homily and Martini's use of it in mind, one might better approach Aquinas' implied equation of the state of original sin with the state of nature as deriving from his attempt to unify the various realms of human experience in his religious philosophy. Endeavoring to incorporate Aristotelian science into his *Weltanschauung*, Aquinas could no longer tolerate the patristic view that the condition of man after the fall was a depraved existence decreed upon him in punishment for sin, rather than his natural state in which all his abilities and virtues could and should be marshalled in pursuit of truly valuable, *human* objectives. Even if fallen man could not merit salvation without the gift of divine grace, his rational nature still reflected the image of God and had it within its grasp to observe the divinely ordained precepts of natural law.[64] In Aquinas' estimation, this world was accordingly not a *massa*

[64] *ST* 1.93.2; 1–2.94, passim.

*peccati*, and its pursuits offered man a legitimate avenue for exercising his spiritual faculties, an undertaking which would optimally run parallel to and be subsumed under the maintenance of a Christian life style. As Ernst Troeltsch observed:

> The opposition between the world and the Kingdom of God, which became, quite logically, the settled form of the early Christian Ethos, was retained [by Thomas Aquinas], but its outlook had entirely changed since the period of the Early Church. No longer is this opposition held to consist in the antagonism between an ecclesiastical ethic, which is identical with the absolute Natural Law of the Stoics, and the relative Natural Law of the Roman order of Society, in which the Christian position is partly one of adaptation to the unchangeable order of Society, and partly one of mastering it, so far as possible, within the Church. The opposition is rather one between two stages of purpose, between mystical supernature and its blessedness in the future state, on the one hand, and Natural Law in general, on the other hand.[65]

Exemplifying the religious value now discerned in the mode of organization of man's existence on earth was Aquinas' approach towards precisely those basic human institutions mentioned in the midrash on *yeṣer ha-ra'*: marriage, the family, the permanent community, and the commercial economy.

As is well known, the patristic outlook of Augustine had viewed all these pillars of human civilization as necessary for the existence of fallen man and as divinely countenanced, but above all as the result of—and thus manifesting the punishment for—original sin. Had Adam not sinned, his perfect nature would have enabled him and his progeny to live with one another in perfect harmony, without the self-centeredness and coercion involved in the patriarchal dominion over the family, earthly government, and private property; only after the fall did the lustful state into which man had fallen require these institutions, usually as means for restraining excessive cupidity, pride, and sexual passion. These usages are not natural to man, and they too share in the miseries of his fallen state: "Every human society from the family to the empire is never free from slights, suspicions, quarrels, and war, and 'peace' is not true peace but a doubtful interlude between conflicts."[66]

[65]Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, trans. Olive Wyon (2 vols.; Glencoe, 1931) 266; see also R. W. Southern, *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies* (Oxford, 1970) 49ff.

[66]Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas*, 62; for general discussions of this patristic outlook, see 78–153; and Troeltsch, *Social Teaching*, 100ff.

Aquinas, on the other hand, incorporated these worldly sentiments and institutions into his own conception of man's *natural* state. Unlike Augustine, he did not condemn the sexuality of fallen man as unnatural or sinful, nor did he consider the bearing of children and the life of the family as involved in the transmission of or punishment for original sin. In and of itself, the activity of man's concupiscible appetite is natural, and even Jesus possessed a sensuous impulse in his assumption of human nature.[67] If immoderate, unreasonable concupiscence has resulted from original sin, it itself cannot be considered that which causes sin in man.[68] Confident that the dominion of one man over another would have existed before the fall, Aquinas proceeded to view organized associations of men, whether on a familial or political scale, as natural and appropriate to man:[69] "A communal life is proper to man because he would not be able to provide all that is necessary to life out of his own resources if he were to live like a hermit."[70] Earthly governments are thus not a departure from the natural order to accommodate the needs of fallen man but the best means to enable man to realize his natural capabilities, before and after the fall.[71] And although the institutions of private property and profit-oriented commerce might not have existed in the state of original justice and are not ordained by natural law, Aquinas did consider them natural to man in the sense that they constituted appropriate additions to natural law on the part of human reason. In view of man's obligation to care for the earth's resources, private ownership is actually necessary for human life; without it, individuals would shirk their responsibility to care for material goods, terrible chaos would result in the apportionment of such responsibility, and strife would break out between men owning things in common.[72] On the question of seeking financial profit, Aquinas found the means to justify trade and commerce in terms

[67] *ST* 1–2.82.3, ad 1; 1–2.94.2; 2–2.154.2; 3.18.2

[68] *ST* 1–2.89.5

[69] *ST* 1.92.1, ad 2; 1.96.4.

[70] *De regimine principum (De regno)* § 1, in Thomas Aquinas, *Selected Political Writings*, ed. A. P. d'Entrèves, trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford, 1959) 8–9.

[71] Cf. Dino Gigongiari, ed., *The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas: Representative Selections* (New York, 1953) viii–xi; Louis Lachance, *L'humanisme politique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Individu et état* (Paris, 1965); R. A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine* (Cambridge, 1970) 211–30.

[72] *ST* 2–2.66.2; see also 2–2.66.1.

of their remotest necessity or value for the common weal; even if one might deem commercial activity that lacks a praiseworthy rationale somewhat shameful, "nevertheless, profit, which is the point of commerce, while it may not carry the notion of anything right or necessary, does not carry the notion of anything vicious or contrary to virtue either."[73] Once again, the Thomistic position comprised a noteworthy break with previous religious thought and did much to change the prevalent attitudes of European Christendom toward such basic worldly activities.[74] Whereas Aquinas did not in any way deny the effects of Adam's fall on mankind, he did acknowledge that "at a deeper level human nature as such was essentially committed to and engaged with the powers of the material world."[75]

The Thomistic valuation of an active life in this world, grounded as it was in the novel conception of original sin, suggests still another affinity between Aquinas and his Dominican confrère, Raymond Martini. One might well view the attempt to bring the social, political, and economic affairs of this world under the control of the medieval Church in order to fashion a truly unified *societas christiana* in Europe as a tendency which climaxed in the thirteenth century. The patristic view that the world was essentially alien to the City of God reflected the reluctance of the early Church to assert its complete primacy in the temporal sphere on ideological grounds. Yet later in the medieval period, the *romana ecclesia* came to be viewed not merely as the papal see or delimited jurisdiction of the pope in a Christendom governed jointly by temporal and spititual swords, but rather as comprising the entire Christian *respublica* or *congregatio fidelium.* All of society was considered an organic unit, whose *raison d'être* consisted of

[73]*ST* 2-2.77.4 (38. 228-29).

[74]Bede Jarrett, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages, 1200-1500* (London, 1926) chaps. 5-6; Richard Schlatter, *Private Property: The History of an Idea* (London, 1951) 33-55; John F. McGovern, "The Rise of the New Economic Attitudes—Economic Humanism, Economic Nationalism—during the Later Middle Ages and the Renaissance, A.D. 1200-1500," *Traditio* 26 (1970); John W. Baldwin, "The Medieval Theories of the Just Price: Romanists, Canonists, and Theologians in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, n.s. 49 (1959) 63-67, 75-79; Raymond de Roover, "The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy," *Journal of Economic History* 18 (1958) 418-34, and idem, *San Bernadino of Siena and Sant' Antonio of Florence: The Two Great Economic Thinkers of the Middle Ages* (Boston, 1967) passim.

[75]Thomas Gilby, *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Chicago, 1958) 155.

striving for and ultimately realizing the perfect unity of Christ on earth. Within such a unity, every component or constituent element had to be evaluated from a teleological perspective: Not only did each component and characteristic of the whole have to further the ideals of the whole, but it also had to embody them on a microcosmic level—a concern which became most blatant in the religious and intellectual history of the thirteenth century.[76] This century began with the truly ecumenical Fourth Lateran Council, convened by Pope Innocent III in order to perfect the unity of the Church;[77] it saw the founding of the papal Inquisition[78] and the first official codification of canon law in Gregory IX's *Decretales*,[79] both attempts to enforce the unity of Christendom on the various components of Christian society; and it heralded the age of organic, Scholastic theology, as epitomized in the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas, the complete synthesis and logical exposition of Christian religious thought—an expression of the unity of Christian theology both in form and in content.[80]

[76]For a description of this mentality, see Otto Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, trans. Frederic William Maitland (1900; reprint ed., Boston, 1958) 1–30; and Anton-Herman Chroust, "The Corporate Idea and the Body Politic in the Middle Ages," *Review of Politics* 9 (1947) 423–52. And on the increasing prevalence of such sentiments from the time of Gregory VII, see Tellenbach, *Church, State and Christian Society*, 126–61; Gerhart B. Ladner, "Aspects of Medieval Thought on Church and State," *Review of Politics* 9 (1947) 403–22; and idem, "The Concepts of 'Ecclesia' and 'Christianitas' and Their Relationship to the Ideal of Papal 'Plenitudo Potestatis' from Gregory VII to Boniface VIII," in *Sacerdozio e regno da Gregorio VII a Bonifacio VIII* (Miscellanea historiae pontificiae 18; Rome, 1954 49–57; Walter Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages* (2d ed.; New York, 1962) chaps. 9–10, 13; Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory* (1955; reprint ed., Cambridge, 1968) 37–46; and J. A. Watt, "The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century: The Contribution of the Canonists," *Traditio* 20 (1964) 279, 312–15.

[77]On the ecumenical nature and the breadth of the legislation of the Fourth Lateran Council, see Raymonde Foreville, *Latran I, II, III et Latran IV* (Paris, 1965) 245–57, 287–306.

[78]See Maurice Bévenot, "The Inquisition and Its Antecedents," *HeyJ* 7 (1966) 257–68, 381–93; 8 (1967) 52–69; and Walter Ullmann, *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages* (London, 1972) 253–54.

[79]See *Rex pacificus*, Gregory IX's bull of promulgation for the *Decretales*, in Thomas Ripoll, ed., *Bullarium Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum* (8 vols.; Rome, 1729–40) 1. 69: "Volentes, igitur, ut hac tantum compilatione universi utantur in judiciis, et in scholis, districtius prohibemus, ne quis presumat aliam facere absque auctoritate Sedis Apostolice speciali."

[80]Such indeed was Thomas Aquinas' primary objective; see the prologue to the *ST*; and cf. Martin Grabmann, *Introduction to the Theological Summa of St. Thomas*,

Among the foremost agents of the Church in the promotion of this policy of unification were the Dominicans and the Franciscans, the two orders of mendicant friars enfranchised by Innocent III early in the thirteenth century. Established by the Church for the purpose of exemplifying and teaching Christian ideals, the mendicant orders excelled in many of the activities which manifested ecclesiastical concern for creating and maintaining a totalistic Christian society.[81] The friars were the important missionaries to infidels and heretics; they manned the Inquisition which combatted all forms of heterodoxy; Raymond de Peñaforte, who served as Dominican master-general and later as the teacher of Raymond Martini, compiled the *Decretales*; and Thomas Aquinas was only one of many mendicant professors who quickly came to dominate the faculties of European universities. In particular, we find pronounced mendicant activity relevant to those same basic human pursuits which Aquinas valued in his philosophical system and which enabled Raymond Martini to identify original sin with *yeṣer ha-ra'*. St. Francis of Assisi himself laid great stress on the spirituality of nature in his theology, and the Third Orders of SS. Dominic and Francis allowed even married persons to partake of the religious life which traditional monasticism had reserved for the celibate willing to withdraw from the life of this world completely.[82] Friars often involved themselves in politics and rapidly became the most trusted advisors of many European monarchs.[83] And recent research has revealed the great significance and extent of the mendicant participation in the urbanization of late medieval Europe and the promotion of an environment geared to the pursuit of commercial profit—in the efforts of the friars to cater to the spiritual needs of middle class communities which had only recently been the prime centers of catharist and

trans. John S. Zybura (St. Louis, 1930) 70; and M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, trans. A. M. Landry and D. Hugh (Chicago, 1964) 299.

[81]On the various activities of the mendicants, see William A. Hinebusch, *A History of the Dominican Order* (2 vols.; Staten Island, NY, 1966–73); and John Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan Order from Its Origins to the Year 1519* (Oxford, 1968).

[82]Edward A. Armstrong, *Saint Francis: Nature Mystic* (Berkeley, 1973) 5–17; Lester K. Little, *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca, 1978) 207ff.; Moorman, *History*, 40–45, 216–25; Hinnebusch, *History*, 1. 400ff.

[83]For specific examples, see Lester K. Little, "Saint Louis' Involvement ith the Friars," *CH* 33 (1964) 125–48; or Martin A. Cohen, "Reflections on the Text and Context of the Disputation of Barcelona," *HUCA* 35 (1964) 181ff.

Waldensian heresies.[84] If Raymond Martini borrowed the Thomistic view on original sin which joined the states of nature and grace in depicting the ideal, integrated mode of Christian existence, it is highly appropriate that he did so within the context of his own attempt, as a Dominican friar, to enhance the unity of Christian society—through the conversion of the Jews.[85]

Finally, the identification of original sin with the evil inclination in Martini's *Pugio fidei* reveals an interesting dimension of this important polemical work. The *Pugio* intended primarily to confute the beliefs of the Jews and convert the Jews to Christianity by citing passages from classical rabbinic literature in support of basic Christian doctrines. Martini, however, had no love for the ancient rabbis or for the Talmud and Midrash which they produced; rather, he believed that this literature and the way of life which it prescribed derived from an alliance between the rabbis and Satan which for the Jews marked a heretical departure from their biblical covenant with God.[86] The talmudic and midrashic passages which Martini excerpted as evidence in his own behalf were exceptional—alleged admissions of the obvious truth of Christianity that the rabbis could not expunge from their literature altogether, which Martini "raised up like pearls out of a very great dungheap."[87] Martini thus eagerly employed such passages against the Jews in the most effective polemical strategy of which he could conceive, though not with any intent to accord legitimacy to post-biblical Jewish traditions. Nevertheless, equating original sin and the evil inclination in the *Pugio* not only served to prove the doctrine of original sin to the Jews but also lent greater credence to the new

[84]Jacques le Goff, "Apostolat mendiant et fait urbain dans la France médiévale: L'implantation des ordres mendiants," *Annales* 23 (1968) 335–52, and idem, "Ordres mendiants et urbanisation dans la France médiévale," *Annales* 25 (1970) 924–46; Barbara H. Rosenwein and Lester K. Little, "Social Meaning in the Monastic and Mendicant Spiritualities," *Past and Present* 63 (1974) 16–32; John B. Freed, *The Friars and German Society in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA, 1977); Little, *Religious Poverty*, chaps. 10–12.

[85]On the friars' concern with the Jews, see my doctoral dissertation, "Mendicants, the Medieval Church, and the Jews: Dominican and Franciscan Attitudes towards the Jews in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries" (Cornell University, 1978). Pages 172–243 deal specifically with Raymond Martini and the significance of his anti-Jewish polemic.

[86]Ibid., 195–209; R. Bonfil, "The Nature of Judaism in Raymundus Martini's *Pugio fidei*," [Hebrew], *Tarbiz* 40 (1971) 360–75.

[87]*Pugio*, prooemium §§ 5–9, pp. 2–4.

Thomistic conception of original sin, which corresponded in many respects to the notion of *yeṣer ha-ra'*. Perhaps the dearth of Spanish scholastic philosophers in general and those positively disposed towards Aristotle and Aquinas in particular[88] motivated Martini to advocate his Thomistic views wherever they were relevant in the *Pugio fidei*, not only in the brief opening section which attacked the Averroistic beliefs of skeptical Moors. The condemnations of Averroism in France and England, which occurred just as Martini wrote his *Pugio*, included a significant number of Thomistic propositions and may well have given Martini added impetus to defend his teacher and colleague.[89] Only recently, Martini's own master Raymond de Peñaforte, himself probably wary of Aristotelian incursions into traditional theology, had persuaded Raymond Lull not to study theology in Paris but to remain for that purpose at the Dominican convent in Palma, Majorca.[90] Especially in the wake of the condemnations of Paris and Oxford, the greater exposure of Christian Spain to Arab influence might have heightened the sensitivity and opposition to Aristotelian philosophy,[91] and probably not by accident did Lull, the most renowned Spanish thinker of the period, become a staunchly traditional Augustinian. Martini certainly had good reason to use every tactic available to him in support of his own more radical formulations.

Without such an understanding of Martini's intentions, one is hard pressed to explain the friar's citation of a lengthy rabbinic homily on the value of *yeṣer ha-ra'*, a midrash which could hardly have aided in establishing the reality of original sin to a Jewish audience. Admitting the possibility of this additional purpose on Martini's part broadens the perspective in which one must view his polemical *magnum opus*—i.e., as deriving from the multifaceted

[88]Ivo Höllhuber, *Geschichte der Philosophie im spanischen Kulturbereich* (Munich, 1967) 27–31.

[89]On the condemnations of Averroism and the accompanying opposition to Aquinas see Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955) 402–27, 725–49; Daniel A. Callus, *The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford* (Oxford, 1955); and Pierre Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme latin au xiii^e siècle* (2d ed.; 2 vols.; Louvain, 1908–11) 1. 80–112, 196–251, passim. Specifically, with regard to original sin, see Gross, *Geschichte*, 3. 302–13.

[90]See the Latin version of Lull's contemporary biography in E. Allison Peers, ed., *A Life of Ramon Lull* (London, 1927) 52.

[91]On Spanish Averroism, see Marcelino Menendez y Pelayo, *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles* (2d ed.; 7 vols.; Madrid, 1911–32) 3. 244–55.

attempt of thirteenth-century Christendom, undertaken in large measure by the friars, to secure and maintain the perfect Christian unity of society and human life. Ironic indeed is the fact that at the same time as this campaign led Martini to polemicize against rabbinic Judaism, it moved him to adduce rabbinic support for the "organic" Thomistic approach to the world and nature, a mindset which could reasonably admit that

> a universe in which there was no evil would not be of so great goodness as our actual one; and this for the reason that there would not be in this assumed universe so many different good natures as there are in this present one, which contains both good natures free from evil as well as some conjoined with evil; and it is better to have the combination of both rather than to have one only.[92]

[92]Aquinas, *In II Sent.*, 44.1.2, ad 5 (Vivès, 7. 528), trans. in Bigongiari, *The Political Ideas*, xi.